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INTRODUCTION

"These people are barely making ends meet; [they] will go to one
of these [payday lending] places for what they think is a quick fix and
find out that it's a nightmare. They never get out from under it."
H.C. Klein, Founder
Arkansans Against Abusive Predatory Lending'
Flora Johnson, a thirty-six-year-old single mother, lives in the
Mississippi Delta. Every day she hears about the country's
economic downturn and looming recession. She worries, for the
hundredth time, about how she will pay the bills this month.2
While she has a steady job earning about $25,000 per year, Flora,
like millions of Americans, cannot rest easy: 3 she has just reached4
the limits of her credit cards and home foreclosure is imminent.
When an unexpected medical bill comes in the mail, Flora sighs in
resignation. 5 Even though she worries about paying it back, she
knows just where she must turn for help: a payday loan. 6 Payday
loan stores are everywhere in Mississippi. 7 Besides being one of

1. Jim Edwards, Editorial, Legal Usury in Arkansas, CAMDEN NEWS
(N.J.), Oct. 24, 2007, at 4, http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/pdfs2/07_1024_
editorial.pdf.
2. For a discussion of the challenges facing middle-class American
families (including fictional characters like Flora, who need to take out a payday
loan), see ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 4
(2003) (arguing that the number of American families who find themselves in
serious financial trouble is "shockingly large"); id. at 57 (arguing that the middle
class has no safety net and no place to turn "in the case of a calamity"); id. at
112 (noting that compared to past generations, average savings for families has
dropped to -1% and credit card debt has risen to 12%).
3. See Aaron Huckstep, Payday Lending: Do Outrageous Prices
Necessarily Mean Outrageous Profits?, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203,
216-18 (2007) (comparing studies of average salaries of payday loan borrowers
and concluding that the average salary is likely in the mid-$20,000s).
4. See Nick Carey, Payday Loans Exacerbate the Housing Crisis,
REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN1045
663120080324 (showing the correlation between home foreclosure rates and
families' increased reliance on payday lenders to make ends meet).
5. See WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 2, at 85 (noting illness
increases the likelihood that families are in poor economic shape and must
declare bankruptcy).
6. Cf Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 124
(2004) (explaining that payday lenders often serve borrowers who cannot use
credit cards).
7. Infra note 8.
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the nation's poorest and most rural states, 8 Mississippi
has more
9
payday lending stores than McDonald's restaurants.
With payday lenders such as Cash Money Payday Loans,
Advance America, and Check-into-Cash lining the roads to and
from work, Flora finds it easy to select one and request a $325
loan, the state's average. 1° To obtain the loan, she shows only her
driver's license and proof of a bank account and an income.' The
lender never checks her credit, which is one reason the loan is so
appealing and easy to get.' 2 She writes the lender a personal check,
and he agrees not to cash the check until after her next payday in
two weeks.' 3 For the $325 loan, the lender charges $55, which

8. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income Climbs, Poverty
Stabilizes, Uninsured Rate Increases (Aug. 29, 2006), http://www.census.gov/
Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income wealth/007419.html (explaining
Mississippi has one of lowest mean incomes in the nation). See also Rural
Poverty Research Center, http://www.rprconline.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2008)
(showing the location of persistently poor counties in the United States, many of
which cluster along the Mississippi River and in the Mississippi Delta area).
9. For per-capita payday lending store saturation, see Email from Beth
Orlansky, Staff Attorney, Mississippi Center for Justice (Sept. 18, 2007) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Orlansky Email]. See also Steven M. Graves, Cal. State
Univ. Northridge, Payday Lenders vs. McDonald's, http://www.csun.edu/sg4002/research/mcdonaldsbystate.htm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2008)
(explaining Mississippi has 124 McDonald's restaurants and more than 1,100
payday lending establishments).
10.

URIAH KING, LESLIE PARRISH & OZLEM TANIK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE

LENDING, FINANCIAL QuICKSAND: PAYDAY LENDING SINKS BORROWERS INDEBT
WiTH $4.2 BILLION IN PREDATORY FEES EVERY YEAR 2 (2006), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rrO I2-FinancialQuicksand- 106.pdf.
11. See id. at 3.
12. See Erik Eckholm, Seductively Easy, Payday Loans Often Snowball,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at Al, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/23/us/
23payday.html (noting because lenders do not check borrowers' credit,
borrowers may be more likely to default in some situations; however, most
borrowers extend loans and pay repeat fees to lenders).
13. Flora, who is a fictional character, is an example of millions of
Americans who rely upon "alternative financial services," including check
cashing and payday lending. This Article will focus solely on payday lending.
Check cashing, not to be confused with payday lending, occurs when a provider
cashes an employer's check in exchange for a service fee. Payday lending
occurs when a lender makes a temporary loan against the delayed cashing of an
employee's post-dated personal check. See JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING
30-31 (1994); KING ET AL., supra note 10. The term "payday" developed
because when consumers seek loans, they write a date on their checks to
correspond to their next payday. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L.
Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of
Payday Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 673 (2005).
Theoretically, after the next payday, the borrower's checking account would
contain more money, and at that time the lender would cash the check. As this
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works out to an Annualized Percentage Rate ("APR") of 531%.14
The lender never explains the interest rate computation to Flora,
and she never asks.
A few weeks later, Flora realizes she does not have the extra
money to repay the lender. Concerned that her check will bounce if
the payday lender deposits it, Flora decides that she will instead
renew her loan. She pays $55 that month and every month
thereafter, "rolling over" the loan without paying a cent toward the
principal. Flora eventually pays nearly $800 in interest on her
original loan. 16 Her lender probably knew this would happen; in
fact, he urged her to roll over the loan, knowing full well the debt
would trap her. 17 Later, when a friend asks why she would agree to
such oppressive loan terms, she says with regret that she thought
her luck would change and that she could someday pay the money
back. 18
Flora's story is not unique. The payday lending industry has
raised the ire of borrowers, lawyers, and consumer advocates
because they say lenders are "predatory."' 9 That is, lenders prey on

Article will demonstrate, the theoretical ideal of payday lending is rarely
realized.
14. To calculate the APR on a $325 loan, take the fee ($55), divide by the
amount received ($270) and multiply by the fraction of the number of days in a
year (365) divided by the loan length (14 days). See, e.g., Mississippi Check
Cashers Act Regulations, 03-000-015 MISS. CODE R. § 3(4) (Weil 2003), available
at http://www.dbcf.state.ms.us/documents/cons-finance/final-checkcashingregs
-2-20-2003.pdf (formula for APR calculation).
15. Rollover loans are common. For an informative interview with Rebecca
Flippo, a former payday loan officer, see Video: Inside the Payday Industry: Loans
Trap Borrowers (Ctr. for Responsible Lending 2007), http://www.responsible
[hereinafter Flippo
lending.org/issues/payday/inside-the-payday-industry.html
Interview] (explaining that borrowers usually take out a $500 loan and spend
$3900 in fees on the same $500 amount from the original loan).
16. Flora's story was based loosely on true stories from KING ET AL., supra
note 10. See also Thomas A. Wilson, Comment, The Availability of Statutory
Damages Under TILA to Remedy the Sharp Practiceof Payday Lenders, 7 N.C.
BANKING INST. 339, 339-40 (2003) (reporting story of young woman trapped in
payday lending cycle); MISS. ECON. POLICY CTR., MISSISSIPPI PAYDAY LENDING
FACT SHEET 1, (2007), http://www.mepconline.com/images/admin/spotedit/
attach/4/PaydayLendingFact Sheet_FINAL.pdf.
17. See Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an
End to Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday
Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1280-81 nn.263-65 (2001).
18. See Posting of Paige Marta Skiba, Why do People Use Payday Loans?,
to Credit Slips, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/03/why-do-peopleu.html (Mar. 17, 2008).
19. See notes and materials from Miss. College Sch. of Law, Economic
Justice Summit on Payday Lending, July 23, 2007 (on file with author)
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unsophisticated poor people and ensnare them in extremely
expensive loans with an average APR of 470%.20 Loans become
predatory when payday lenders lend to borrowers through five or
more transactions a year. 2 1 According to the Center for
Responsible Lending, a consumer advocacy group, 91% of payday
loans fit this description. 22 Each month, lenders across the country
collect thousands
of dollars in interest from the people who can
23
least afford it.
In this Article, my argument is two-fold. I argue first that the
problems facing payday loan borrowers are particularly acute in
the South. I argue second that legislation aimed to protect
borrowers is pitifully weak, and in some cases futile, for residents
in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas. Given this framework, I
nevertheless suggest federal and state solutions to protect
borrowers. Part I provides background information about typical
lenders, their practices, and relevant legal developments. Part I also
situates payday lending among the economic, educational, and
geographical challenges facing many southern residents. Part II
describes the payday lending laws of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Arkansas. Part III recommends solutions for effective protection of
borrowers in the South.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

A. Development of the Payday Lending Industry
Payday lending has changed dramatically from a relatively
unknown financial service in the early 1900s to a billion-dollar

[hereinafter Economic Justice Summit]. See also Eckholm, supra note 12
(noting most money comes from borrowers who "rollover" loans, repaying fees
each month until they pay off loan amount, thus creating extraordinarily high
interest rates).
20. See Consumer Fed'n of Am., Payday Loan Consumer Information:
Facts, http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/facts.cfm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008); see
also supra note 14 and sources cited therein; Orlansky Email, supra note 9.
21. Miss. ECON. POLICY CTR., supra note 16.
22. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FACT v. FICTION: THE TRUTH ABOUT
PAYDAY LENDING INDUSTRY CLAIMS (2001), http://www.responsiblelending.
org/issues/payday/briefs/page.jsp?itemlD=29557872.
23. Id. See also Eckholm, supra note 12 (describing a New Mexico man
who reportedly traveled thirty miles each month for his "ritual," in which he
would give $1,500 to lenders for loans he had taken out years ago); Jane Bryant
Quinn, Payday Loans Can Be a Trap, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8. 2007, http://www.
newsweek.com/id/41906/ (explaining "over two years, a $300 loan, renewed and
renewed, can cost $2,340 and you're still in debt").
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industry in 2008. Payday lending has roots in the "salary buying"
business in which consumers who needed short-term cash
sometimes took advantage of "salary buyers." 24 A buyer purchased
a borrower's salary and provided immediate funds in exchange for
the right to "buy" the borrower's entire salary in the future.25 When
a borrower did not pay the loan on time, salary buyers used
aggressive collection tactics, leading working class people to coin
the term "loan sharks." 26 For most of the twentieth century,
borrowers applied for modest loan amounts at low rates, thanks to
strict caps on interest rates (usury).27 Until the 1980s, most states
had traditional usury rates that capped interest between 18% and
42%.28 In the mid-1980s and 1990s,
states began to relax their
29
prohibition on high interest rates.
In 1993, an entrepreneur named W. Allan Jones established the
payday lending industry when he opened his first Check-into-Cash
store in Cleveland, Tennessee. 30 A payday loan is fundamentally
different from other products, such as a pawnshop loan. The
interest rate is higher, and Rayday loan borrowers are legally
obligated to pay their loans. 1 These borrowers cannot simply
surrender their security ("pawn") and walk away. The industry
grew quickly, and from 2000 to 2004, the number of payday
lending stores more than doubled, in part because of each store's
profitability. 32 With $300,000 in the market, a lender can
potentially make $1,716,000 in one year. 33 A whopping 90% of the
revenue generated in the payday lending industry comes from
interest and other fees charged by borrowers. 34 In 2007, payday
lenders collected $8.6 billion in fees from American families
24. See CASKEY, supra note 13, at 31 (explaining the origins of payday loans).
25. Id.
26. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 13, at 670.
27. WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 2, at 128 (noting that usury
laws used to create "ironclad limits" on lending and families that wanted to
borrow money had to prove they had a very high likelihood to repay).
28. Patrick Enright, Thou Shalt Not Steal? The Surprising Correlation
Between Payday Lenders and Conservative Christians, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21,
2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/1 14407.
29. See id
30. See Huckstep, supra note 3, at 205.
31. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1273.
32. See Huckstep, supra note 3, at 205 ("[T]he number of payday lending
stores rose from 10,000 in 2000 to 22,000 in 2004.").
33. See NYU Wagner Sch. of Pub. Serv., Presentation, Strategies to Combat
Payday Lending in Mississippi 5 (Feb. 11, 2008). The presentation also notes
that the majority of a lender's profits come from borrowers who take out more
than seven loans. Id.at 7.
34. KING ET AL., supra note 10, at 7.
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borrowing nearly $50 billion in loans. 35 To maintain high
revenues, lenders must be savvy about their target market.
B. Lenders' Customer Base
The typical lender knows who its best customers are:
America's poorest people. The payday lending industry affects one
in twenty Americans, which means that the range of borrowers is
huge. 36 A typical borrower is likely to be a woman who earns
anywhere from $18,000 to $50,000 a year.37 Like most Americans,
she lacks basic financial literacy, which makes it more likely for
her to agree to the loan terms. 38 Lenders are fully aware that people
from poor areas are likely to default
39 and can be coaxed or
threatened into rolling over their loans.

35. See Bob Driehaus, Some States Set Caps to ControlPayday Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/us/07payday.html
(according to the brokerage firm Stephens, Inc. in Little Rock, Arkansas, lenders
collected $8.6 billion in fees in 2007).
36. See John Leland, Nonprofit Payday Loans? Yes, to Mixed Reviews, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/O8/28/us/28payday.html.
37. DoughRoller.net, How to Get a Payday Loan (If You Must), http://
www.doughroller.net/money-management/-payday-loan/ (last visited Nov. 3,
2008) (noting more than 60% of payday loan borrowers are women). In terms of
income, not all studies agree that poor people, like Flora, are typical payday loan
customers. See Huckstep, supra note 3, at 214. For example, one industrysponsored study explains that most payday loan borrowers are "middle" class,
have access to other forms of credit, have steady jobs, and "use payday loans
exactly as intended," for short-term emergencies. Id.Other studies dispute the
average annual income of borrowers, suggesting most borrowers are high school
or even college graduates making close to $50,000 each year. Aimee A. Minnich,
RationalRegulation ofPayday Lending, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 84, 88 (2006).
38. See Daniel McGinn & Temma Ehrenfeld, Clues for the Clueless,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 14, 2008, at 28, http://www.newsweek.com/id/130590.
39. See Steven M. Graves & Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law and the
ChristianRight: Faith-BasedPoliticalPower and the Geography of American
Payday Loan Regulation, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 637, 643 & n.22 (2008) (noting
"[i]nvestigations by federal banking regulators and statements of former payday
lending employees confirm that payday lenders create compensation incentives
encouraging employees to manipulate borrowers into long-term borrowing").
Borrowers accept loans because they do not know they can do better. See
WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 2, at 136. See also Edmund L. Andrews,
Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/business/I 8subprime.html?_r= 1&hp&oref=-slogin;
Paul Krugman, Editorial, A Catastrophy Foretold, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/opinion/26krugman.html (noting a speech by
late Federal Reserve Governor Ed Gramlich, in which he asked why "the most
risky loan products are sold to the least sophisticated borrowers," and answered
that the "least sophisticated borrowers are probably duped into taking these
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Without offering a payment plan or flexible terms, many
payday lenders "keep consumers poor" by requiring the
impossible: after two weeks, pay the amount in full or pay the fees
associated with a bounced check.4 ° In fact, studies show that it is
mathematically impossible for typical borrowers to repay payday
loans in two weeks. 4 ' In one study, a borrower making $25,000 a
year would, without making payments on a loan, fall short $14
each week on recurring payments for food, housing, healthcare,
transportation, and utilities. 41 She would be unable to pay her loans
without taking a second job--or a second loan. A person making
$35,000 per year would have a surplus of $67 each week to pay
down her loans.43 A slightly longer repayment term could provide
positive results for borrowers, as one South African study found. 44
A "loan alternative," such as a credit card advance, could be more
manageable. The APR on a bank-issued credit card is 98.18% and
the APR on a credit union-issued credit card advance is 10.99%. 4
However, these options are not generally available.
With statistics like these, it is no wonder borrowers "roll over"
their loans to the next pay period. 46 On average, borrowers like
Flora roll over a loan seven times.47 Some lenders characterize
borrowers who renew loans more than seven times as "26ers,"

products"). The concept that lenders can dupe unsophisticated people is also a
theme in payday lending.
40. See Flippo Interview, supra note 15.
41. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1280-81 nn.263-65.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Economists Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman also found that payday
lenders can provide a positive support mechanism, at least in South Africa. In a
recent study, a South African lender experimented by offering loans to those who
were previously ineligible; those customers took out a 200% interest loan and paid
it back during a four-month period. The researchers found that the customers were
less likely to go hungry and their chances of being in poverty fell 19% because of
the loan. While the researchers found higher stress levels, particularly among
women borrowers, the customers reported more control over their lives and a
positive outlook. In Praiseof Usury, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2007.
45. ARK. ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, PAYCHECKS AND
POLITICS 2 (2006), http://www.aradvocates.org/_images/pdfs/Altematives2.pdf.
This option is not available to all residents. Recall that Flora, from the
Introduction, turned to payday loans because she had reached the limits on her
credit cards.
46. See Huckstep, supra note 3, at 207 (explaining most borrowers do not
have funds to pay original loan and seek renewal or rollover). See also Wilson,
supra note 15, at 340-41 (explaining payday loans are short-term transactions in
which most lenders make money through rolling over loans).
47. Wilson, supra note 16, at 341.
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because they may take out one loan and then roll it over every two
weeks (twenty-six times) for an entire year to avoid defaulting on
the original loan.48 Many consumers take out a second or third loan
from another payday lender49 to pay the first, thus becoming
indebted to multiple creditors.
Payday lenders know where to find their desired customers:
economically disadvantafed areas, towns near military bases, 50 and
minority neighborhoods. Payday lenders' geographically oriented
tactics have become so well-known that they inspired Seattle-based
programmer Mike Mathieu to start a satirical website, "Predatory
Lending Association," about the targeting phenomenon. 52 The site
includes a Google map tool using "patent-pending Poor FinderTM
technology" that "locates the most profitable lending locations by
analyzing sales records from pawn shops, liquor and gun stores,
and the lottery." 53 Make no mistake, lenders seek poor,
unsophisticated customers-and then they sell the customers
products they do not need and cannot afford.

48. See KING ET AL., supra note 10; Driehaus, supra note 35 (noting twothirds of lenders' revenue comes from borrowers who take out a dozen loans
annually). See also Huckstep, supra note 3, at 205.
49. See Graves & Peterson, supranote 13, at 663.
50. See id. at 704-08 (showing a general correlation between ZIP codes
with a high population of military and ZIP codes with the greatest number of
payday lenders); id. at 755-61 (specific information about Louisiana); Miss.
ECONOMIC POLICY CTR., supra note 16, at 5 (military personnel are more likely
to use payday loans).
51. Payday lenders also target certain racial demographics, with some
scholars demanding that payday loans be "called by their true names: legally
sanctioned corporate plans to steal from minorities." WARREN & WARREN
TYAGI, supra note 2, at 160. Many are located in areas with large percentages of
minority residents. In Washington, payday loan stores are twice as likely to be
located in African-American areas as in white areas. In Texas, lenders are more
likely to lend to African-Americans, who comprise 43% of borrowers even
though the state's African-American population is 11%. See notes and sources
cited, supra note 13. Similar results have been found in the Native American
community. See FIRST NATIONS DEVELOPING INST., BORROWING TROUBLE:
PREDATORY LENDING IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES (2008), http://www.
firstnations.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Predatory
Lending" hyperlink on left).
52. See Predatory Lending Ass'n, http://predatorylendingassociation.com (last
visited Oct. 1, 2008). See also Craig Harris & John Cook, The Insider: Satirical
Site Bashes PredatoryLending, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 19, 2007, at
Cl, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/340153_theinsideri 9.html.
53. See Predatory Lending Ass'n, supra note 52.
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C. Lenders 'Inconsistent and Unlawful DisclosurePractices
The typical lender also knows how to market its product. Many
lenders go to great lengths to conceal important financial
information from their customers. 54 For example, although some
states have "posting" laws requiring lenders to post information in
large font in a visible place, those laws are rarely followed. 55
Furthermore, even if the lender posts the information, he does not
always explain it to the consumer. The former manager of a
payday loan store explained in a video for the Center for
Responsible Lending that when selling financial products, she and
her coworkers would disclose the loan's APR, but they would not
talk about it or explain what it meant. Loan salespeople would
also patronize and goad borrowers into signing lending documents,
as depicted in the documentary Maxed Out, where one salesperson
said, 't]his is going to be all right. Just put your little name right
here. ' Lenders can thus easily take advantage of vulnerable
borrowers.
Additionally, interest rates are typically calculated based on the
face value of the payday loan check, which may confuse
consumers. Thus, instead of paying 17.5% APR, the borrower pays
17.5% of the check's face value every two weeks. Not surprisingly,
this rate may be more than twenty-six times what the consumer
thinks (because interest compounds every two weeks for a year).58
Most payday loan consumers mistakenly believe they are paying
the same rate they pay their credit card company. 59 Borrowers are
in such a desperate financial
state that they will believe anythingand lenders know it. 60
54. See Flippo Interview, supra note 15 (noting that borrowers often did not
know or understand what "APR" meant).
55. See infra Part I.C. This information barrier may weaken in the future. In
January 2008, the Community Financial Service Association of America
(CFSA) began requiring that all of its affiliated payday lending stores provide
clear, easy-to-read posters that will show the amount of the advance, the fee, and
the annual percentage rate of borrowers' loans. See Press Release, Cmty. Fin.
Serv. Ass'n. of Am., Payday Lending Industry Implements Unprecedented Fee
Disclosure (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.cfsa.net/downloads/PressReleases/Fee
%20Implementation.pdf.
56. See Flippo Interview, supra note 15.
57. See MAXED OUT: HARD TIMEs, EASY CREDIT AND THE ERA OF
PREDATORY LENDERS (Trueworks 2006).
58. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 13, at 662.
59. See id.
60. Katie Orr, Confusion Mars Ohio Vote on Payday Loans (NPR All Things
Considered radio broadcast Oct. 22, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=95997205 (quoting one borrower describing the payday
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D. Legal Developments ConcerningPayday Lending

Besides being characterized as targeting certain demographic
populations and luring them into a debt trap, the industry is also
known for its disregard for the law. 61 Indeed, several payday
lenders are now facing lawsuits from former and current
borrowers. 62 The63 suits have arisen from violations of federal and
state legislation.
The following discussion paints a general picture of the legal
landscape of payday lending. Two federal laws govern the
industry, although the laws provide minimal protections for
borrowers. Many states have attempted to either curtail payday
lending activities through rate caps, licensing statutes, or banning
payday lenders altogether. 64 Unfortunately, due to slow-moving
litigation and a lack of enforcement, these efforts have not been an
efficient tool to regulate payday lending.
1. FederalEfforts to CurtailPredatoryPaydayLending

The federal government has attempted to regulate the payday
lending industry, although lenders have used federal regulations to
their advantage.6 5 For example, the National Bank Act (NBA)

lending experience: "You're in such an emotional state, you see it as a solution
and you don't really think about it.").
61. See Graves & Peterson, supranote 13, at 664.
62. See, e.g., Livingston v. Fast Cash USA, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 572 (Ind.
2001) (holding that lenders could not charge minimum loan finance charges
above 36% APR). See also Marie Price, Class-Action Lawsuit Filed in a
Pennsylvania Court Names Okla. Lenders as Defendants, J. REC. (Oklahoma
City, Okla.), Sept. 19, 2007; Laura Smitherman, $17 Million Still Lost in Check
Case, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 2, 2007, at IA (class action based on theft from
consumers); Yvonne M. Wenger, Legislators Join Suit Over Loans: Payday
Lenders Face New Complaint, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Sept. 20,
2007, at B 1.
63. See, e.g., Jim DuPlessis, Bill Puts Heat on Payday Lenders, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), May 4, 2008 (explaining a recent bill to ban payday lending in
South Carolina following news that borrowers had sued South Carolina-based
Advance America, the nation's largest payday lender, in several class-action
lawsuits).
64. Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia have
effectively banned payday lending establishments. KING ET AL., supra note 10,
at 23. Arkansas, the District of Columbia, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Ohio
have capped rates at 36% or lower. Driehaus, supra note 35.
65. Arguments for federal regulation to cap interest rates are strong but need
to be fully developed. See, e.g., WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 2, at
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"even[s] the playing field between relatively weak federal banks
and burgeoning state banks." 66 The NBA evened the playing field
by allowing federal banks to charge customers in other states the
interest rates in the states where the federal bank was located.67
Payday lenders have used this law to their advantage. Although no
longer allowed, payday lenders affiliated with federal banks in
states with no interest rate restrictions-and thus charged whatever
they wished.68 For example, in Hudson v. ACE Cash Express, an
Indiana district court judge dismissed a customer's complaint that
an Indiana payday lender charged an interest rate of 391% on a
payday loan in violation of the state's interest rate cap.69 The court
found that because the lender was affiliated with a national bank in
California, and the California Constitution prohibits rate caps, the
lender did not violate the law. At the time, the lender acted legally
in charging an incredibly high interest rate.7 °
One federal law that Congress intended to protect consumers
from being misled about the cost of credit is the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA). 7 ' The statute addresses issues such as disclosure
statements, total finance charges, damages, and APR.72 In 2000, the
Federal Reserve System added an official commentary stating that
TILA regulates payday loans.73 Even with this commentary, certain

149 (arguing that regulation would "eliminate the worst abuses of a lending
industry run amok" but neglecting to expand upon that claim).
66. See National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2000). See also Bruch, supra
note 17, at 1262.
67. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1262.
68. See id. See also Graves & Peterson, supra note 39, at 677 (noting the
Supreme Court's decision in Marquette Nat ' Bank v. First of Omaha Service
Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 312-13 (1978), "sparked a new era of federal preemption
of state usury limits by granting national banks the authority to export high
interest rates from [other] states"); Graves & Peterson, supra note 13, at 705;
Economic Justice Summit, supranote 19.
69. See Hudson v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. IPO1-1336-C-H/G, 2002
WL 31255461 (D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2002).
70. See id. But see Flowers v. EZPawn Oklahoma, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
1191, 1196 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (holding the lender did not act legally); Goleta
Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 718-19 (E.D.N.C. 2002).
71. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2000). See also Jackson v. Am. Loan Co.,
No. 99 C 2067, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9143, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 1999),
affd, 202 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining the legislative history of TILA).
72. See §§ 1601-1665. One issue that has become particularly challenging
for consumers is statutory damages, governed by section 1640. Circuit courts are
split over whether the statutory damages provisions contained in section 1640
apply to payday lenders. For a discussion of this issue, see Wilson, supra note
16, at 346-50.
73. See 65 Fed. Reg. 17131 (Mar. 31, 2000).
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provisions of the law, such as TILA's statutory damages sections,
can frustrate a plaintiff's attempt to seek a remedy. 74 As with the
NBA, however, actions to sue payday lenders are not always
successful, and this law provides weak protections to consumers.
2. State Efforts to CurtailPredatoryPaydayLending
States can provide stronger protections to consumers by
imposing interest rate caps on payday loans.76 Advocates of the
payday lending industry argue the caps are unfair and that they
must charge extremely high interest rates because of their
operating costs. 77 They also argue that they charge high rates
because the market will bear it: payday lending, in their eyes,
provides a necessary service to a population with such poor credit
loans. 78
that they often cannot qualify for credit cards or other bank
Lenders have circumvented rate caps by "deceptive
recharacterizations" of the true nature of the loan products. 7For
example, to circumvent state laws concerning interest rates on
small loans, payday lenders will claim their loans are simply
"deferred presentment products," meaning that their only service is
deferring presentation of the check to the issuer's bank by waiting
two weeks to cash it.80 Therefore, according to these lenders, a
payday loan is not a loan at all.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1640. See also Wilson, supra note 16, at 346-49.
75. See Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., L.L.C., 400 F.3d 868
(11th Cir. 2005) (holding that under TILA, unconscionability of a payday
lending agreement could be determined by the court instead of an arbitrator);
Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
plaintiffs' claims for damages under TILA); Cooper v. QC Fin. Servs., 503 F.
Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Ariz. 2007) (same).
76. See infra Part III.A-B.
77. See Huckstep, supra note 3, at 221. Furthermore, many payday lenders
are fighting interest rate caps by collecting signatures to add statewide ballot
initiatives to overturn the lending cap. Driehaus, supra note 35. Some voters
claim that the advertisements for the initiatives are confusing voters by
characterizing bans on lending as job-loss initiatives. See Orr,supra note 60.
78. See Huckstep, supra note 3, at 221.
79. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1274.
80. See id. Another practice, which a New York court has since found to be
illegal, was one in which a lender used catalog sales with gift certificates.
Borrowers would have to buy $15 in gift certificates for every $50 they wished
to borrow. The borrowers would present the store with a check that totaled the
amount of the certificates plus the amount they wished to borrow, and the store
would deposit the check the next payday. See ConsumerAffairs.com, No Payday
for Payday Lenders in Texas, New York, May 11, 2005, http://www.
consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/nypayday_case.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2008).
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Another way states curtail payday lending is to require lenders
to apply for a state license and follow laws regulating loan
advertising. 8 1 Nevertheless, some payday lenders refuse to obtain
licenses and offer misleading advertisements about the cost of
credit. 82 Their disregard for the law goes unpunished because many
states do not have the resources to regulate and monitor the payday
lending industry.8 3 Furthermore, many states do not punish payday
lenders who use false threats of prosecution to intimidate
borrowers. 84 With minimal enforcement, payday lenders have few
incentives to comply with state law, and plaintiffs have little hope
of recovering damages.
Finally, states can restrict payday lending through the common
law doctrine of unconscionability. The doctrine, a combination of
statute and common law, has been applied through the Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-302 to most credit-related
legislation. 85 The Restatement (Second) of Contractsstates that the
doctrine of unconscionability prevents oppression of parties and
eliminates unfair surprise in contracts. An analysis of whether a
transaction is unconscionable relies on two prongs: substantive
unconscionability and procedural unconscionability. To determine
whether a transaction is substantively unconscionable, a court will
look at whether an agreement is so "one-sided" that it "shocks the
conscience. '87 Courts have held that a 500% interest rate on a
payday loan is unconscionable, as is a clause prohibiting class
action lawsuits. 88 To determine whether a contract is procedurally
unconscionable, a court will consider the relative bargaining
strength of the parties and examine whether the complaining party
had a meaningful choice, considering the party's intelligence,
81.

See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1275.

82. Id.

83. See CASKEY, supra note 13, at 9-10 (arguing that American "society
devotes substantial resources to protecting consumers in the financial markets
and institutions serving middle- and upper-income households" but that very
few resources are devoted to regulating "fringe banking" establishments such as
pawnshops and payday loan stores).
84. See also DuPlessis, supra note 63.
85. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1263 (citing cases in which courts applied
unconscionability doctrine to relevant credit-related legislation).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (2002).
87. See id.cmt. d (summarizing cases that exemplify factors weighing in
favor of a finding of unconscionability in contexts such as apartment leases,
insurance, and employment).
88. See Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc., 195 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 1999)
(interest rate); Cooper v. QC Fin. Servs., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1279 (D. Ariz.
2007) (holding that a payday lender's policy prohibiting class action suits
against the payday lender is unconscionable substantively, procedurally, and
against public policy, but granting defendant's motion to compel arbitration).
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education, and level of financial distress. 89 Litigation on theories of
90
unconscionability in the payday lending context is limited.
In sum, the federal and state laws in this area have developed
slowly and tend to favor lenders. 91 Consequently, vulnerable
borrowers have little judicial recourse and will seek effective
protections through other means. Thus, a legislative solution based
on clarifying and strengthening laws is the optimal means to
achieve protection for southern borrowers.
E. Payday Lending in the South
which to
The South is a particularly relevant lens through
on residents. 92
examine the payday lending industry and its effects
Some researchers say the "culture of debt" in the region stems
from the vestiges of sharecropping. 93 Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Arkansas are home to some of the "most entrenched" payday
94
lenders, many of whom have been there for a decade. These three
states also have the highest and most persistent poverty rates in the
country. 95 Further, the labor pool in the South is largely
uneducated, with low proportions of college-educated workers and
who do not plan to
high proportions
96 of high school graduates
attend college.

89. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
90. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1278-81.
91. See supra note 62.
92. Telephone Interview with Steven M. Graves, Professor of Geography,
Cal. State Univ. Northridge (Oct. 4, 2007) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Graves Interview]. This region is also interesting, considering the
strong religious underpinnings of such highly Christian states. One would
expect, as Professors Graves and Peterson did, that in highly religious areas,
state government would apply biblical principles condemning usury in economic
legislation to protect residents. They found that the opposite is true. States with
high political power among Christian groups also have a high density of payday
lenders. The researchers defined political power by a number on the "Christian
Power Index," which is generated by ranking states according to three variables:
(1) the per capita density of evangelical Christians and Mormons; (2) the
Christian Political Organization score assigned by three political actions groups;
and (3) voting records. For example, Mississippi ranks first in payday lending
activity and second on the Christian Power Index. See Graves & Peterson, supra
note 39. See also Enright, supra note 28.
93. See MAXED OUT, supra note 57; Graves Interview, supra note 92.
94. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 39, at 700.
95. See sources cited supra note 8.
96. See THE HIDDEN AMERICA: SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN RURAL AMERICA FOR
THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Presses, Inc. 2001).

28 (Robert M. Moore III ed., Associated Univ.
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Payday loan problems are especially acute for southerners.
First, southern residents' limited economic opportunities mean that
they are more likely to take out payday loans without considering
the alternatives. 97 Second, southern residents have lower levels of
educational attainment and financial literacy, which means they
have fewer avenues to inform themselves about alternatives to
payday loans. 98 Third, spatial isolation and limited transportation
mean that even if residents knew of lending alternatives, they
would have greater difficulty accessing them. Isolation contributes
to residents' lack of political clout as residents do not have the
know-how to influence 99
legislation, including laws related to
regulating payday lending.
1. Economic Challenges
Statistics describing the typical southern family and the typical
payday loan borrower indicate that the two groups overlap
significantly. In terms of earning potential, the typical payday loan
100
borrower earns an annual salary in the mid-$20,000s range.
Similarly, residents in the South are low earners, with an average
annual household income of $30,549 for male workers and $21,584
for female workers. 10 Residents of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Arkansas who earn incomes that are lower than that of the average
payday loan borrower are likely to use payday loans.
Furthermore, the jobs available to some southern residents are
often less financially rewarding than those available in states with
more affluent populations. 10 2 In southern states in particular,
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
females

See infra Part I.E.1.
See infra Part I.E.2.
See infra Part I.E.3.
See Huckstep, supra note 3.
In Mississippi, the median annual income for males is $30,549; for
it is $21,584. For similar statistics in Louisiana, see U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, AMERICAN FACT FINDER: DP-3 PROFILE OF SELECTED ECONOMIC

CHARACTERIsTICs (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html? lang
=en (follow "Data Sets" hyperlink; then follow "Decennial Survey" hyperlink;
then click on third radio button for "Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF-3)"; follow
blue link for "Quick Tables"; under "Select a geographic type," select "State" and
then add states).
102. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Missing the Mark: Welfare Reform and Rural
Poverty, 10 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 439, 464 (2007). See also FORGOTTEN
PLACES: UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL AMERICA 3 (Thomas A. Lyson &
William W. Falk eds., 1993) (arguing many rural families "are unable to
improve their life chances because of structural factors beyond their control...
[constituting] a reserve army of unemployed and underemployed workers");
U.S. DEP'T AG. ECON. RES. SERV., RURAL EMPLOYMENT AT A GLANCE,
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residents find themselves relegated to low-skilled work and
welfare assistance. °3 Due to limited economic opportunities, poor
residents will rely upon additional income sources-or income
advances-4 help them through tough economic times. Thus,
without the possibility of earning more money, 1°4 many workers
will turn to payday lenders to make ends meet.
2. EducationalChallenges
Besides economic factors, low levels of educational attainment
and financial literacy increase the likelihood of payday loan usage.
Educational attainment in states with significant rural populations
is lower than the national average.' Y Education levels also
correlate with financial literacy. °6 Further, education levels matter
when courts consider whether to enforce an agreement between a
person from a rural area and an experienced lender.' 0 7 Uneducated
borrowers might find it more challenging to understand basic
financial concepts, such as APR calculations. 10 8 In an industrysponsored telephone survey, 72% of payday loan borrowers did not
know the APR of their most recent loans; those who thought they
did guessed that the actual rates were lower.' 0 9 In these states, the

INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 21 (2006),
Rural [hereinafter RURAL EMPLOYMENT].
103. See RURAL POVERTY IN AMERICA

http://www.ers.usda.gov/Emphases/

104 (Cynthia M. Duncan ed., 1992).
See also Lisa Pruitt, Gender, Geography, and Rural Justice 15-16 (Aug. 1,
Studies Research Paper No. 129), available at
2008) (UC Davis Legal
http://ssm.com/abstract=- 103559.
104. See Pruitt, supranote 103, at 446 (explaining "most rural residents share
certain structural challenges to financial survival").
105. See U.S. DEP'T AG. ECON. RES. SERV., RURAL DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH REPORT No. 98 (2004) (updated Mar. 1, 2007), http://www.ers.usda.
gov/publications/rdrr98/rdrr98.htm (explaining that 15.5% of those twenty-five
and over have bachelor's degrees, compared with 26.6% nationally).
106. See Deborah Thorne & Katherine M. Porter, Financial Education for
Bankrupt Families 3, (Jan. 2008) (Univ. Iowa College of Law Paper No. 08-03),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1032968.
107. See, e.g., State v. Hamrick, 236 S.E.2d 247, 247 (W. Va. 1977) (taking
note of plaintiff, a "twenty-six year old woman of very limited intelligence, [who
is a] poor, uneducated... resident of rural West Virginia" and holding that she
was entitled to a new trial because, due to her lack of intelligence, she could not
have understood paperwork she signed at a police station when charged with
voluntary manslaughter); LaCour v. Sanders, 442 So. 2d 1280 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1983) (holding that in a dispute over property ownership, the property owner who
was an uneducated rural resident was a good faith possessor).
108. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
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percentage of payday loan borrowers who did not know the APR
for their loans would quite possibly be even higher than 72%. As a
result, payday lenders in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas can
take advantage of residents by talking them into accepting a loan
they do not fully understand.
3. GeographicalChallenges
Distance can also exacerbate borrowers' vulnerabilities to
payday lenders. Most people underestimate the challenges that
physical distance poses to America's poorest people. They assume
that physical distance is no obstacle for people with limited means.
In the South, 20% of the population is considered "rural," whichI0
means they live away from cities of 50,000 or more people."
Because of this geographical isolation, families have limited means
and are at a greater risk for debt problems."' One financial
journalist suggested recently that, to avoid payday loans of $200 or
$300, poor people should just "borrow that $300 from relatives...
or spend $300 less.'' l 2 Most poor families, especially those that
are physically isolated from each other, have neither rich relatives
nearby nor the option to spend less money. 113 They spend their
meager salaries on necessities such as transportation or medical
care. 14 It may not be feasible to travel somewhere else to pick up
additional funds.
Physical and technological isolation also makes it more
difficult for residents to connect as advocates and lobby for greater
protections for themselves.1 15 Residents' physical distance from one
another means they are disconnected from larger social movements,
information about loan alternatives, and the Internet. 16 Thus,
support and advocacy will likely germinate in urban areas. One
110. U.S. DEP'T AG. ECON. RES. SERV., RuRAL POVERTY AT A GLANCE,
RuRAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH REPORT No. 100 (2004) http://www.ers.usda.

gov/publications/rdrrlOO/rdrrlO0_lowres.pdf [hereinafter Rural Poverty at a
Glance].
111. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 39, at 683-84.
112. See Quinn, supra note 23.
113. Pruitt, supra note 102, at 18 (describing networks of kith and kin in
rural areas and noting that most engage in informal economy together and are at
same economic level).
114. See Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of
Rural Failure, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 969, 1008 (2005) (explaining budgetary
priorities of rural families).
115. See Pruitt, supra note 102, at 17-18 (explaining how "structural
obstacles" including lack of transportation and child care restrict labor force
participation and shape their status as workers).
116. Id.atl9n.74.
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solution that accommodates southern residents' isolation is mobile
7
services that enable residents to access information more easily. 1
In sum, payday lending is an acute problem nationwide and
especially in the South. Payday loans are expensive, and borrowers
do not always understand the loan terms. Lenders target poor
people, and many lenders circumvent the law. Lawsuits are helping
to change the industry, but progress is slow. In regions where both
financial resources and educational attainment are minimal,
borrowers may feel extra pressure to take out loans. However,
spatial isolation makes it more challenging for borrowers to learn
about and access alternatives. Unfortunately, without government
intervention, borrowers may learn too late the high price they have
paid for quick, "convenient" cash.
II. STATE LAW

Most southern states, including Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Arkansas, have welcomed payday lenders. These three states offer
varying degrees of protection for payday borrowers and differing
restrictions on payday lenders. Of the three, Louisiana is the
friendliest to lenders, and Arkansas is the least friendly. Because of
their proximity to one another, these three states provide a
fascinating basis for comparison.
The first question for many consumer advocates, however, is
whether these services are truly necessary and, if so, whether states
effectively regulate them. One consumer advocate, who compared
borrowers' reliance on payday lending to a crack cocaine addiction,
told a local newspaper, "[l]ots of folks buy crack, but that doesn't
mean there's a legitimate need for it."' r8 Annually, states lose
millions in loan fees that could instead stay in local
communities. 119 Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas are all
grappling with how to best regulate the payday lending industry.
A. Louisiana
Payday lenders may find Louisiana a good place to do business.
Besides its minimal regulations, Louisiana has entertained other
forms of short-term, high-interest loan legislation, including car title
117. See infra Part III.B.

118. Andre Salvail, Payday Loan Perils: Critics See Rash of Payday-Loan
Stores as Predators on Low-Income Earners, THE INDEPENDENT (Lafayette,
La.), July 26, 2006, http://www.theind.com/index.php?option=comcontent&
task=-view&id=262&ltemid= 103.
119. See infra Part II.A-C. See also NYU Wagner Sch. of Pub. Serv., supra
note 33.
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12 1
loans. 120 In 2007, the state was home to 977 lending outlets.
Borrowers generated total loan fees of $345,877,855, and the APR
for Louisiana lenders was 560%.122 These figures are high relative
to other states because Louisiana has lax regulations and its
Attorney General has not aggressively pursued enforcement. The
and Small Loan Act ("Louisiana
Louisiana Deferred Presentment
23
Act") governs payday loans.'
Several provisions in the Act are noteworthy. First, the
legislative intent of the Louisiana Act initially states that payday
loans "meet a legitimate credit need" for many consumers and lastly
states that to "protect consumers from excessive charges," certain
restrictions on lenders are necessary.' 24 This statement suggests that
protecting lenders is a higher priority than protecting consumers.
Second, the maximum fee and posting language is both vague and
permissive. A licensee may not charge greater than 16.75% of the
face value of the check or $45, whichever is greater. 125 The Act
permits loan rollovers. 126 Further, the Louisiana Act encourages, but
does not require, posting a notice of the fees in a "conspicuous
manner" at the lending location. 127 These provisions, especially
regarding posting, are unclear.
The Act's provisions have implications for Louisiana
borrowers. Louisiana's stated commitment to sustaining the
payday lending industry signifies that consumer protection is a
lower priority than industry protection. Permitting rollovers means
that poor people will not understand the risks of relying upon
multiple lenders when they "borrow from Peter to pay Paul." As a
former president of the Better Business Bureau in Acadiana, home
to a large (and mostly poor) Cajun population, observed, borrowers
often do not understand what they are doing, and "they [are not]
aware of the repercussions of [their actions]."'' 2 8 A law requiring
posting in a "conspicuous manner" is not specific enough to help
borrowers, like those in Acadiana, who are sometimes unaware of

120. For example, Louisiana legislators proposed State Senate Bill 743 and
House Bill 924/1050 in 2006. The bills would have gone so far as to allow
lenders to offer short-term loans with the borrower's vehicle as collateral. The
bill was defeated. See Salvail, supra note 118.
121. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 39, at 696.
122. KING ET AL., supra note 10, at 17.
123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9: 3578.1 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
124. § 9: 3578.2.

125. See § 9:3578.4.
126. See § 9:3578.6(7).

127. See § 9:3578.7.
128. See Salvail, supra note 118.
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the consequences of the borrowing. The Louisiana Act does not
require the payday lender to do very much at all.
Even if the legislature clarified aspects of the vague Louisiana
Act, several ineffective protections remain. First, the Office of
Financial Institutions (OFI) planned in 2006 to post those payday
lenders that consumers have rated highly on its website.12 As of
the time of this writing, the posting has yet to happen.
Furthermore, the website's design is poor and information is not
readily accessible or obvious to users. 30 The OFI should instead
consider the number of residents who will seek payday loans and
look to more traditional outreach: advertisements in newspapers,
on television, and radio. Advertisements could contain ratings
information from the website as well as basic financial
information. Second, all complaints about payday lenders must be
directed to the Attorney General, and they must be made in writing
only. This requirement could exclude people whose educational
backgrounds may not enable them to engage in a letter-writing
campaign. Instead, the state should consider also adding a
telephone number for complaints.' 3 1 The payday lending situation
in Louisiana offers a point of comparison with Mississippi's more
progressive approach.
B. Mississippi
Mississippi provides somewhat stricter laws than Louisiana for
its 1,069 payday lending stores. 132 Payday lenders in the state
collected nearly $200 million in loan fees in 2006.133 The average
APR was 573% in 2007.134 The Mississippi Check Cashers Act
("Mississippi Act") regulates the payday lending industry.
The Mississippi Act addresses topics similar to those in the
Louisiana Act but provides greater specificity. First, the
Mississippi Act caps the maximum loan amount at $400 per

129. See id.
130. See id. See also La. Office of Fin. Insts., http://www.ofi.state.la.us (last
visited Dec. 1, 2008). As of Dec. 1, 2008, the OFI website did not contain any
listing of payday lenders who lost their licenses.
131. See infra Part III. See also § 9:3578.7 (suggesting the state
commissioner may provide notice in lending location with toll-free number for
the commissioner's office).
132. See Graves & Peterson, supranote 39, at 681.
133. See NYU Wagner Sch. of Pub. Serv., supra note 33. See also MIss.
ECON. POLICY CTR., supranote 16, at 2.
134. See KING ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. See also Graves & Peterson,
supra note 39, at 689 tbl.2 (interest rates).
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loan.' 35 Unlike the Louisiana Act, which is silent about the
required language of its payday loan contract, the Mississippi Act
is very clear that each contract between lender and borrower "shall
be documented by a written agreement that has been signed by the
customer and licensee."' 36 The agreement must contain a statement
of the total amount of any fees charged, "expressed as a dollar
amount and as an annual percentage rate."' 137 The fee can be no
greater than 18% of the face amount of the check. 13 1 Instead of
vague language requiring "conspicuous posting" of rates, the
regulations accompanying the Mississippi Act require a twentyinch-by-twenty-inch sign that must be "large and bold" in order to
allow customers to easily read the information. 39 The poster must
also include contact information for the Mississippi Department of
Banking and Consumer Finance,
in case there are "unresolved
0
problems" with transactions.14
The regulations provide an example of the proper computation
of the APR and the fee, information that borrowers and their
advocates can use in enforcement actions. 41 Another protective
measure states that a payday lender may accept a credit card as
payment, but the lender may not charge the credit card at the
beginning of the transaction, "thus encumbering the customer's
funds . . '.,"42
Finally, the law prohibits some rollovers, stating
that "no check cashed under the provisions of this section shall be
repaid by the proceeds of another check
cashed by the same
143
licensee or an affiliate of the licensee."'
For Mississippi consumers, the greater specificity of the
Mississippi Act protects those who might make poor decisions due
to limited economic and educational resources. The provision to
cap loan amounts and fees helps prevent an accrual of fees, which
could trap residents for years. The provision to require plain
135. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-67-519(2) (1998 & Supp. 2007). This
provision and all others under section 67 are scheduled to be repealed effective
July 1, 2012.
136. See § 75-67-519(3).
137. Id.
138. See § 75-67-519(4).
139. The Department of Banking and Consumer Finance promulgates the
accompanying regulations, the Mississippi Check Cashers Act Regulations. In
addition, section 5 requires the lender to post the fees for payday loan. See
Mississippi Check Cashers Act Regulations, 03-000-015 MISS. CODE R. § 5
(Weil 2003), available at http://www.dbcf.state.ms.us/documents/consfmance/
final check cashing regs-2-20-2003.pdf.
140. Id.(providing example of required sign).
141. Seeid. § 3(4).
142. See id. § 3(10).
143. See id. § 3(5) &(10).
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language in the contract reduces the likelihood of unconscionability
due to oppressive and unclear contractual terms. Further, regulations
that prevent rollovers could force consumers to make different
financial choices, such as paying off the loan or accepting a
bounced check fee.
In terms of specific protections for borrowers, the only
information appears to be a "For the Consumer" section on the
Mississippi Department of Banking and Consumer Finance
website. The section simply includes a list of regulatory agencies
and "consumer alerts."' Again, this information is available only
to people who can afford computers or are close to libraries with
public computer access. While Mississippi provides protection for
consumers through more detailed language, its solutions and
protections are not sufficiently strong. Arkansas has even more
specific laws and better protections.
C. Arkansas
The State of Arkansas has some of the most borrower-friendly
legislation in the country. The payday lending industry there is
small compared to those of Louisiana and Mississippi. Arkansas
has just 264 stores14 5 charging $27,512,665 annually in fees. 44 The
average APR was 432% in 2007.147 Arkansas is unique because it
is one of the only states with usury laws, which prohibit
excessively high interest rates.1 48 The state constitution imposes a
usury cap of 17% APR on consumer loans. 49 Many payday
lenders, however, have violated the state constitution by charging
higher rates. 150 In 1999, payday lenders lobbied for a law to
legalize their activities. They succeeded, and the Check Cashers
Act of 1999 ("Arkansas Act") stated that the interest charged in
check-cashing and payday lending does not violate the usury laws
because lenders may charge "service fees," but not interest.1 5 1 In
2001, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found parts of the statute
144. See Miss. Dep't of Banking & Fin., For the Consumer, http://www.
dbcf.state.ms.us/consumer.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2008).
145. See Graves & Peterson, supra note 39, at 696.
146. See KING ET AL., supra note 10, at 17.
147. Id.See also Graves & Peterson, supra note 39, at 689 tbl.2 (interest
rates).
148.

See ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13.

149. Id.
150. See Edwards, supra note 1 (noting many payday lenders continue
charging 295% in loan fees, despite usury provisions).
151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-52-104 (2004). See Check-Cashing Rules &
Regulations, pt. XVIII(A), availableat http://www.asbca.org/pdf/rulesregs.pdf
(business practices referring to "service fees permitted by law").
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unconstitutional, and in early 2008 the state Attorney General
began cracking down on lenders, asserting in a March letter that
156 lenders were charging interest well above the state's usury
caps. 152 In May, the Attorney General sued four lenders for
violating the state constitution by charging borrowers excessive
interest rates. 153 In November 2008, the Arkansas Supreme Court
held that allowing lenders to charqe triple-digit interest rates did
indeed violate the state constitution.
Several key provisions distinguish the Arkansas Act and its
accompanying regulations from the Mississippi and Louisiana
Acts. In terms of disclosure, the payday lender must post a
detailed, unambiguous schedule of fees, a list of acceptable
identification, and its license permit. 155 As in Mississippi, the
regulation requires that lenders display fee signs in plain view with
a large-size form and typeface. Fees are 10% of the face value of
the check, in addition to a $5 initial processing fee and a $10 fee
for personal checks. These fees are lower than those in both
Louisiana and Mississippi. The Arkansas Act states that the
agreed-upon date for the check deposit must be presented in
language that is "clear and understandable" to the customer. The
regulations permit the consumer to make partial loan payments
without additional fees. 1 56 Arkansas is also progressive in that it
prohibits "unfair or unconscionable" business practices. 157
For Arkansas consumers, the Act and its regulations provide
strong protections. First, low fees mean that payday lending will
not make those who use it even poorer. The partial payments
152. See Chris Rizo, Arkansas AG Files Suit Against PaydayLenders, LEGAL
May 3, 2008, http://legalnewsline.com/news/211867-arkansasag-files-suit-against-payday-lenders.
153. Id.
154. McGhee v. Arkansas State Bd. of Collection Agencies, No. 08-164,
2008 WL 4823540 (Ark. Nov. 6, 2008).
155. See Check-Cashing Rules & Regulations, supra note 151, pt. XIV.
156. See id. pt. XVII (A)-(G).
157. See id. pt. XXI ("No licensee shall engage in unfair or deceptive acts,
practices or advertising in the conduct of its check cashing business."). Lest the
picture appear too rosy, it should be noted that enforcement remains a problem
even in a state with strong legislation. Even with highly protective laws in place,
unfortunately, payday lenders are not following the rules. According to a report
by one nonprofit organization, even though the Arkansas Act prohibits repeat
borrowing, many payday lenders ignore the law and rollover loans every two
weeks. See ARKANSANS AGAINST ABusIVE PAYDAY LENDING, PAYDAY

NEWSLINE.COM,

LENDERS IN ARKANSAS: THE REGULATED AND THE UNREGULATED: AN
UPDATED STUDY 6 (2006), http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/pdfs/news%20

articles/06_0200_PaydayUStudy.pdf. Furthermore, the lenders also ignore the
prohibition to limit outstanding payday loans to $400, often issuing loans for
nearly double that amount. See id.
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provision is unique, as it means a consumer like Flora, had she
lived in Arkansas, would have been able to pay her loans bit by bit
instead of having only the option to pay everything at once.
Furthermore, language prohibiting unconscionability puts the onus
on lenders to make the loan terms fair. The language also shows
the state's commitment to protecting vulnerable borrowers.
Arkansas state agencies have enacted specific solutions to
combat lenders' disregard for the law. First, the Division of Check
Cashing, which attaches to the state's Board of Collection
Agencies and Credit Bureaus, relies upon the advice of a board of
directors ("Board"). 158 The Board consists of five members
appointed by the Arkansas Governor.' 59 Those members represent
various constituencies, including credit bureaus, check-cashing
companies, the public, and the elderly. 160 Other solutions require
state support for alternatives to payday loans, such as working with
creditors to develop payment plans.' Creditors' interest rates are
more manageable than those that payday lenders charge.
Arkansas's laws are the most progressive and clear of the three
states analyzed in this Article. Other states could look to
Arkansas's approach as a model in tackling inequities in payday
lending.
In sum, states have addressed problems of payday lendingspecifically unregulated interest rates and the posting of
information-in a variety of ways. Beginning with the Louisiana
Act, one can easily trace the progression from laws that favor the
lender to those that favor the borrower, ending with the Arkansas
Act. Southern residents will benefit from laws that increase access
to information about payday lenders and provide solutions that will
support fiscally sound decisions.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS

This careful review of the relevant statutes in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Arkansas shows that each state has areas for
improvement. A judicial enforcement is too slow to provide the
protections borrowers need. So, current federal and state solutions
provide a starting point for recommendations. However, current
federal solutions are not promising.

158. ARKANSANS AGAINST ABUSIVE PAYDAY LENDING, supranote 157.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 13.
161. ARK. ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supranote 45.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 69

A. CurrentFederalSolutions
Considering the differing treatment that borrowers face when
getting payday loans in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, it
would seem that national legislation or national programs could be
effective means to protect borrowers. After all, the federal
government already regulates some aspects of the banking
industry. 162 For example, TILA requires that payday lenders
disclose to consumers
163 the finance charge as a dollar amount and
the APR on a loan.
More recently, representatives in Congress have proposed bills
attempting to regulate the payday lending industry. Unfortunately,
none of the bills has made it past committee. For example, H.R.
1684, the Payday Borrower Protection Act of 1999, proposed
extensive licensing, reporting, and procedural safeguards.' 64 In
early 2007, New Mexico Representative Tom Udall introduced
H.R. 2871, the Payday Loan Reform Act of 2007, which proposed
to "amend the Truth in Lending Act and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act to prohibit payday loans based on checks drawn on,
or authorized withdrawals from, depository institutions and to
prohibit65 insured depository institutions from making payday
loans."1
One federal law that has taken effect, the Military Lending Act,
sets interest rate caps of 36% on certain payday, auto title, and
other loans made to military families.' 66 Upon hearing testimony in
2006 that high-interest loans were one of the biggest personal
financial problems facing the military in the past 100 years,
members of Congress acted quickly. The impetus for the law arose
from the desire to protect soldiers near military bases, who often
become targets of predatory lenders.' 67 North Carolina Senator
Elizabeth Dole said at a hearing that "predatory lenders are
blatantly targeting our military personnel, undermining stability,
and tarnishing their service records." 68 She added that predatory
162. See supra Part I.C. Furthermore, Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren
Tyagi have argued that regulating the lending industry to protect consumers
makes sense, given current regulation of products like children's pajamas,
aspirin, and automobiles. WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 2, at 147.
163. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (2000).
164. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1285.
165. See Payday Loan Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 2871, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 10-2871.
166. Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2007).
167. See supra Part I.B.
168. Press Release, Consumer Fed'n of Am. & Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.,
Military Lending Act to Take Effect October 1: Federal Law Will Protect
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loans undermine military readiness. 169 Congress is unlikely to
enact a similar law that would protect all borrowers in the near
future. With an ongoing war and the accompanying sentiment that
stabilizing service members' financial backgrounds is akin to
protecting our country, the military can show a stronger need for
protection than poor borrowers can. Passage of a federal law to
regulate payday lending is therefore unlikely.
The federal government has nonetheless implemented informal
measures to protect borrowers. For instance, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) started a program called "Money
Smart," which attempts to improve financial literacy among lowand moderate-income adults.'0 The program partners with local
organizations, such as housing authorities, to offer classes to
adults, and it has recently begun offering classes to high school
students. 17' Studies have shown that financial literacy classes
beginning at a young age are effective in helping attendees avoid
future financial difficulty. 172 The FDIC has begun a pilot program
173
through banks in which banks will distribute small-dollar loans.
The loans will have APR rates below 36% on loans less than
$1,000, an automatic savings component, and loan amortization
periods longer than a single pay cycle. 174 The purpose of this pilot
program is to expand relationships with individuals who do not use
mainstream banking and to "create consumer goodwill" by
offerin products "with significant savings over payday loan
fees."' On a more modest level, the Federal Trade Commission,

Troops and Their Families From Some Predatory Loans (Sept. 27, 2007),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/FINALMLAtakeeffectPR9-27-07.pdf.
169. Id.
170. The Federal Government's Role in Empowering Americans to Make
Informed Financial Decisions Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the Districtof Columbia
of the Committee on Homeland Security and GovernmentalAffairs, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/
spapr3007.html.
171. See id.See also McGinn & Ehrenfeld, supra note 38 (noting only
eighteen states require personal finance instruction in high schools but noting
increase in education following subprime mortgage crisis).
172. See, e.g., Thome & Porter, supra note 106 (noting that over half of
respondents, who were selected based on bankruptcy filings and willingness to
answer questionnaires, believed that a financial management course would have
helped at least "somewhat" to avoid bankruptcy).
173. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Small-Dollar Loan Pilot Program, http://
www.fdic.gov/smalldollarloans (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
174. See id
175. See id
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in a publication called "Payday Loans--Costly Cash," instructs
1 76
consumers, "[s]hop first and compare all available offers.',
These examples show the ways in which the federal government
has, ineffectively, addressed the payday lending problem.
B. CurrentState Solutions
Individual states need to be catalysts for change although state
action will be difficult, but not impossible." 7 Given the
aforementioned considerations about the harm that payday loans
cause to a state's residents, the threshold question is whether a state
should even permit payday lending in the first place. 178 Solutions
will need to: (1) address economic concerns with favorable loan
terms; (2) address education through outreach; and (3) address
spatial isolation through mobile services. These recommendations
focus on
79 the borrowers themselves-4o invest in people, not
places. 1
The following recommendations are part of a two-step process.
First, a state must decide, either through a decision by the state
legislature or a referendum of the voters, whether to permit payday
lending.' 80 Second, if the state decides to allow payday lending, the
legislature should proceed to draft clear and specific laws governing
the industry. 18 The state must also commit financial resources to
176. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Consumer Alert, Payday Loans Equal Very Costly
Cash: Consumers Urged to Consider the Alternatives (Mar. 2008), http://
www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt06O.shtm.
177. In 2007 and 2008, state legislatures failed to pass measures that would
protect borrowers. See, e.g., H.B. 149 (La. 2008) (reducing maximum fee for
lenders from 16.75% to 15%); H.B. 1291 (Miss. 2008) (requiring banking
commissioner to impose civil penalties on payday lenders in limited situations);
H.B. 718 (Miss. 2008) (increased disclosure); S.B. 923-86 (Ark. 2007)
(designed to impose duties and restrictions on check-cashers who serve military
customers); H.B. 1216, S.B. 2801 (Miss. 2007) (requires check casher licensees
to file annual reports with commissioner of banking and consumer finance).
178. See, e.g., Eckholm, supra note 12 (noting that in New Mexico,
advocates are split between those who want to outlaw the industry and those
who want to promote tough rules, such as mandatory reporting of loans and
limits on fees and rollovers).
179. See THE HIDDEN AMERICA, supra note 96, at 317 (suggesting that rural
economic policy begin investing in residents). See also DAvID L. BROWN &
Louis E. SWANSON, CHALLENGES FOR RURAL AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 2 (2003) (arguing equity is reason to be concerned with rural people).
180. Although spatial distance separates residents in some areas such that
lobbying or protesting together might be difficult, other efforts, such as petitions
signed in front of grocery stores, might be effective in amassing the required
support behind reform.
181. Cf Robert H. Frank, Payday Loans Are a Scourge, But Should Wrath
Be Aimed at the Lenders?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/
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enforcement and outreach. Several of the provisions from the
Mississippi and Arkansas Acts are excellent models.
The recommendations involved in the first step are as follows.
States should:
1. Ask payday lenders to provide data about typical borrowers.
The State of Illinois has already begun doing so, with good
results.1 8 2 Through data collection, the state can ascertain
whether payday lending is a strong economic influence.
2. Establish a taskforce to ascertainthe effects ofpayday lending
on the populace. Arkansans Against Abusive Predatory
Lending (AAAPL) is an active group that has issued several
reports since its formation in 2003. The task force should (a)
report to the state agency that regulates payday loans and (b)
enlist the support of state representatives to disseminate task
force findings.
3. Decide whether to ban payday lending. Several states already
seeks to regulate, with a trend toward
have, but the majority
83
greater regulation.'
Assuming that the state's residents wish to allow payday
lending, the second step involves further recommendations for
amending laws to:
4. Add a protective legislative intent. The amendment should
demonstrate the state's commitment to protecting consumers
84
from predatory lenders that prey on vulnerable populations.
Arkansas's language prohibiting unconscionability goes to the
heart of protecting vulnerable people in the state.
5. Ensure enforcement of a rate cap. Even in the three southern
states featured in this Article, which purport to have rate caps,
lack of enforcement is evident. The state should add criminal

2007/01/18/business/18scene.html (arguing that legislators, not payday lenders,
should be charged with responsibility of solving problems in industry).
182. See ILL. PAYDAY LOAN REFORM ACT CONSUMER REPORTING SERV.,
ILLINOIS TRENDS IN PAYDAY LENDING (2006), http://www.idfpr.com/newsrls/
103106VeritecReport.pdf. See also Press Release, State of Illinois: Office of the
Governor, Report Shows Governor Blagojevich's Payday Lending Reforms
Save Illinois Borrowers $6.4 Million (Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.idfpr.com/
newsrls/103106IDFPRPayDayReport.asp.

183. See Frank,supranote 181.
184. The amendment could also include language that encourages
municipalities to consider enacting zoning restrictions for payday lenders. See
Jake Sandlin, NLR Looks at a Delay on Cashers, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE,
Aug. 28, 2007, http://www.stoppaydaypredators.org/pdfs2/07_0828_nlr.pdf
(suggesting municipalities enact zoning laws similar to those governing sexually
oriented businesses).
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penalties for those lenders who continue to issue loans with
interest rates greater than the legal maximum.
6. Allow partialpayments on the principalof the loan.
7. Strengthen the posting requirementsfor consumer information.
a. The Mississippi law is a good model because it is highly
specific. The law should require that posting is mandatory and
attach criminal penalties for failure to comply. State agencies
should routinely inspect payday lenders to insure compliance.
b. The posting should include a sample calculation and fee
schedule, much the way federal
student loan agencies provide
1 85
this information for students.
c. The law should establish a toll-free hotline for consumers
and ensure the posting provides all of the relevant contact
information.
d. The law should require the financial equivalent of the
Surgeon General's health warning displayed prominently at the
lending outlet and in the loan paperwork, so that the consumer
understands the consequences of working- 186with this payday
lender before he or she can receive the loan.
8. Suggest that counties partner with local agencies. A publicprivate or public-nonprofit partnership would provide
187 support,
information-sharing, and resources for local residents.
185. For a sample disclosure form, see Campus Partners, Student Loan
Disclosure Statement, http://www.campuspartners.com/documents/D8218.pdf
(last visited Oct. 1, 2008). Of course, just as with student loans, borrowers may
be so eager--and desperate-that no amount of information is powerful enough
to dissuade them from signing on the dotted line.
186. Surgeon General warnings on alcohol and cigarette packaging caution
against the extreme dangers of using those products. For example, one label says,
"Smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, and may complicate
pregnancy." SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT-REDUCING TOBACCO USE (2000),
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/sgr/sgr2000/highlights/highlightLabel
s.htm. Payday loans may be just as dangerous to a consumer's financial health, and
a warning with equally serious language could be in order. A label might say,
"This loan may be impossible to pay back given your current salary and may
result in serious debt that you cannot escape from in your lifetime."
187. In Louisiana, for instance, a local credit union has developed a "stretch
loan" program with lower fees ($3 per week and 12% interest). See FANNIE MAE
FOUND., INNOVATIONS IN PERSONAL FINANCE FOR THE UNBANKED: EMERGING
PRACTICES FROM THE FIELD (2003), http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/

programs/pdf/fscsASITOC.pdf. A similar program has developed in New
Mexico. See Eckholm, supra note 12 (noting that under the plan, customers who
attend classes and agree not to seek loans elsewhere will have 80% of their loan
fees returned to them and put into a personal savings account). Additionally, the
state could consider partnering with the bank and providing information to
adults and teens. Under the guidance of a state staff person, federal programs,
such as the FDIC's "Money Smart," could also be expanded from high schools
to gathering places for adults, such as community centers.
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These recommendations address the challenges of payday
lending for southerners. Recommendations 4-6 address economic
challenges by limiting oppressive terms. Recommendation 7
ensures that consumers have a greater range of information
available when making decisions. Recommendation 8 focuses on
expanding opportunities for financial literacy and bridging spatial
distances. Whichever recommendations the state adopts, the state
must include outreach efforts designed for all residents and
educational levels. Mobile outreach is ideal because otherwise
residents would have to drive great distances at hours that may be
inconvenient or conflict with work time. 188 Organizations could
take a lesson from library "bookmobiles" and consider creating a
"bankmobile" with staff who would travel to disadvantaged
regions to teach people about financial services and offer
information about loan alternatives.1 89 In sum, the current solutions
are just the beginning of state-specific efforts to regulate payday
lending. These recommendations, if implemented and widely
promoted, could serve as an inspiration for other regions with
similar economic, educational, and geographical challenges.
CONCLUSION

Payday lending creates a number of troubling problems for
America's poorest citizens. Those in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Arkansas face greater challenges with respect to economic
opportunities, financial literacy, and spatial isolation. Being a
southerner and a payday loan borrower is an oppressive
combination.
States must protect consumers from lenders, enforce existing
laws, and ensure that alternatives are accessible. States need to take
measures to protect residents; this Article suggests but a few.

188.

See Salvail, supranote 118.

189. The services would need to address the challenges that some scholars
have identified, such as the rapid changes in the industry that make it hard for
educators to keep up. Stephen Gandel, Why You Can't Teach Money, CNN
MoNEY, Aug. 26, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/25/pf/teaching_money.
moneymag/index.htm?postversion=2008082 6 05 .

